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How does EU energy policy influence the energy policy 
of its neighbors—and vice versa? The relationship 
between the EU and Switzerland offers important 
insights into this question. The case is particularly 
intriguing: the Swiss energy system is closely 
interconnected with those of its surrounding neighbors 
from the EU. However, in contrast to members of 
the European Economic Area (EEA) and the Energy 
Community, Switzerland does not automatically 
implement parts of the EU energy acquis. 
A dedicated Swiss-EU electricity agreement sought 
to address the potential regulatory gaps. Albeit 
negotiated since 2007, this agreement has not 
yet been concluded, since the EU has made the 
conclusion of the electricity agreement dependent 
on the conclusion of an overarching institutional 
agreement with Switzerland. However, the Swiss 
government hesitates to conclude the institutional 
agreement because it is highly controversial among 
Swiss voters and in the current political landscape 
unlikely to stand the test of a referendum. 
In the absence of an electricity agreement, electricity 
relations between Switzerland and the EU remain 
largely unstructured and often depend on informal 
cooperation. Increasingly, this model reaches its 
limits: as the integration and institutionalization of 
the EU energy market moves on and regulatory gaps 
widen, the need for regulated and institutionalized 
cooperation increases. 
The conclusion of a more tailor-made bilateral 
agreement with Switzerland is unlikely for at least 
two reasons. Legally, the EU’s ever-growing energy 
acquis has resulted in a densely regulated and 
institutionalized internal energy market. The high 
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degree of formalization restricts the scope for carve-
outs for Switzerland. Politically, ongoing discussions 
related to Brexit link any negotiations with outsiders 
to the fundamental question about the EU’s future 
relations with third countries. In this context, 
decision-makers in Brussels and Member State 
capitals have adopted a principled approach that 
seeks to ensure the integrity of the EU internal energy 
market and prevents ‘cherry-picking’ by partners. At 
least for as long as Brexit is pending, EU negotiators 
are unlikely to offer concessions to Switzerland.
The gradual integration of EU energy policy has 
implications for the national energy policies of its 
neighbors. While members of the European Economic 
Area (EEA) and the Energy Community implement 
large parts of the EU’s energy acquis, other third 
countries are also affected. Switzerland—physically 
integrated in the European energy grid but lacking 
a formalized mechanism of regulatory adaptation 
with the EU—is an interesting case in this respect, not 
least because of its implications for a UK-EU relationship 
post-Brexit. Currently, an EU-Switzerland electricity 
agreement is being negotiated but its conclusion 
remains highly uncertain. This briefing paper highlights 
that either outcome—with or without an electricity 
agreement—has important implications for the Swiss 
energy transition, Swiss access to European bodies 
of energy policy-making, and Swiss renewable 
investors. Yet, even without an electricity agreement, 
interdependence between the Swiss and EU 
electricity systems will increase, creating pressure to 
find alternative forms of cooperation. 
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Despite unresolved questions about the future 
relationship, Switzerland and the EU are doomed 
to be closely bound. Many physical links connect 
the Swiss and the European energy infrastructures. 
These links will remain in operation for the time 
being, enabling cross-border flows of electricity 
and gas, both of which contribute to the security 
of energy supply. Nevertheless, the form of 
cooperation—with or without and electricity 
agreement—has far-reaching implications for the 
degree of legal harmonization, investments into 
renewable energy, Swiss access to European bodies 
of energy governance, and the achievement of the 
goals set in Switzerland’s national energy strategy, 
the Energy Strategy 2050 . The following paragraphs 
provide an overview of the two scenarios. 
Scenario 1: with an institutional agreement 
and an electricity agreement
An electricity agreement provides guidance on the 
development of Swiss energy governance as well 
as legal certainty regarding the commercial terms 
of trade with the EU. Notably, regulatory integration 
enables “market coupling”, a mechanism facilitating 
cross-border trade of electricity. Market coupling will 
benefit actors engaging in cross-border trade, e.g., 
larger utilities and large pump storage plants.  
Legal harmonization with the EU would partially 
restrict the choice of permissible policy instruments 
to achieve the goals of the Swiss Energy Strategy 
2050. Compliance with EU state aid rules would 
require that Swiss large-scale renewable producers 
may be financially supported only by market-
responsive schemes, such as green certificates or 
feed-in premia (whose size is preferably determined 
by auctions). Hence, with an agreement, the current 
support measure for large Swiss hydropower plants, 
which will expire in 2022, could not be renewed. This 
is a matter of concern for Swiss cantons, who want to 
preserve legal leeway for the creation of new federal 
hydropower support schemes if needed to achieve 
the targets of the Energy Strategy 2050. As far as 
small-scale renewable producers are concerned, 
most of the Swiss support measures are compatible 
with European law. Even after the general phase-
out of direct subsidies starting in 2023, the current 
structure of grid charges provides indirect financial 
incentives for prosumers; these indirect incentives 
remain permissible under European law. 
The expansion of EU rules and practices to 
Switzerland would impact investment decisions 
in Swiss renewables. Because of its leveling effect 
on wholesale prices and enhanced cross-border 
trading opportunities, market coupling might 
redirect investment flows in Switzerland to lower-
cost generation sources (hydropower and solar 
photovoltaics), resulting in less diversification of 
the Swiss renewable energy mix. This tendency 
could be reinforced by technology-neutral support 
schemes that are set in a competitive manner and 
expose investors to electricity price risk. However, 
prospective imbalances in renewable energy 
generation, even with a strong tilt towards hydro and 
photovoltaics, are less of a concern with efficient 
cross-border trade (e.g., through market-coupling). 
Market coupling also brings about new business 
opportunities for Swiss producers of electricity, in 
particular Swiss pumped storage plants that could 
market their flexibility across the border. 
For Swiss energy governance, this scenario has two 
important ramifications. First, full market integration 
will render the proper balancing of the energy 
system easier. This will provide relief for the Swiss 
Transmission System Operator (TSO) Swissgrid, 
which currently has to accommodate unscheduled 
electricity flows from the EU in its network. Second, 
an agreement would provide a more predictable 
framework for professional energy investors, lowering 
the perceived policy and market risk currently attached 
to investment in Swiss renewables. This would 
reduce the cost of financing of utility-scale renewable 
projects in Switzerland and help achieve the goals 
set by the Energy Strategy 2050. Investors in smaller-
scale distributed renewable energy projects are less 
sensitive to policy and market risk, because of their 
mix of financial and non-financial motives. Hence, they 
will be less affected by whether or not an electricity 
agreement is reached. Even though the new EU 
regulations on renewable energy are not (yet) part of 
the negotiated electricity agreement, Europeanization 
will therefore affect the implementation of the goals 
of the Energy Strategy 2050. 
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Finally, the conclusion of an electricity agreement 
will also be relevant for the access of Swiss actors to 
important bodies of EU energy governance. Switzerland 
currently participates—to varying degrees—in European 
bodies that coordinate cross-border flows of energy as 
well as in commercial platforms that facilitate cross-
border trading of electricity. An electricity agreement 
will likely enhance the opportunities of Swiss key 
actors to shape European energy governance by 
formalizing or securing their roles within important 
European bodies (Hofmann, Jevnaker, & Thaler, 2019). 
Most notably, these include observership of the 
Federal Electricity Commission (ElCom) in the Agency 
for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), 
Swissgrid in the European Network of Transmission 
System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), and the 
Swiss Federal Office of Energy (SFOE) in bodies of the 
European Commission and the Council (see Table 1). 
Although Switzerland will still not enjoy the same 
formal position as EU member states, its increased 
formal access will provide it with more opportunities 
for shaping European energy polices. Still, coordination 
among Swiss key actors (SFOE, ElCom, and Swissgrid) 
will be important for turning access into influence. 
In addition, Swiss influence will continue to rely on 
informal contacts, technological know-how, and the 
structural power arising from its important transit 
function for European electricity flows.
Table 1. Swiss channels of influence to European actors, bodies and institutions
Channel Representative Current status With Agreement Without Agreement
ACER EICom Partial oberver Full observer Risk of exclusion
Council of Ministers SFOE/EDA Occasionally invited on informal technical level
Observer at formal 
technical level Risk of less access
ENTSO-E Swissgrid Member without voting rights Voting rights Risk of exclusion
Electricity Coordination 
Group - - Participation No change
Electricity Cross-Border 
Committee - - Observer status No change
European Commission SFOE/EDA Bilateral contacts More access Less access
Florence Forum (EERF) EICom, SFOE Observer No change Risk of exclusion
Informal Meeting of EU 
Energy Ministers
Federal Council or 
SFOE Observer No change Risk of less access
International Balancing 
Platforms Swissgrid Member or observer No change Risk of exclusion
Operational TSO 
agreements Swissgrid Contracting party No change
Risk of less solidarity/
tighter legal 
supervision
Transmission System 
Operators (TSOs) Swissgrid Bilateral contacts No change
Risk of tighter legal 
supervision by EU
Source: Hettich et al. (2020), pp.88-89
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Scenario 2: without an institutional agreement 
and an electricity agreement
Without an electricity agreement, conditions of trade 
may deteriorate over time, most likely leading to less 
cross-border trade and reduced import capacity than 
in a scenario with an agreement, to inefficiencies in 
the European and Swiss electricity system, and to 
higher wholesale prices in Switzerland. To the extent 
that higher electricity wholesale prices in Switzerland 
translate into higher electricity retail prices for Swiss 
consumers, this might create disadvantages for 
energy-intensive industries and vulnerable consumers. 
In other countries, increasing electricity prices, whether 
they are causally related to energy policy or not, 
have led to controversial political debates. A similar 
development in Switzerland could create challenges 
for the social acceptance of the Energy Strategy 2050. 
However, higher prices might also create incentives to 
reduce electricity consumption and to deploy higher-
cost generation and storage technologies within 
Switzerland. 
At the same time, this positive effect could be 
somewhat counterbalanced by limited investments 
resulting from perceived risks and reduced access 
to international trading opportunities. Hence, in the 
no-agreement scenario, national security concerns 
gain more weight and the achievement of the Energy 
Strategy 2050 requires incentives for a balanced 
portfolio of electricity generation technologies, with 
sufficient options to invest in domestic storage and 
to market flexibility. Among others, this may require 
investments into renewable energy sources that are 
more difficult to implement in Switzerland; in fact, 
meeting the need for flexibility by increasing fossil 
electricity production through new gas-fired power 
plants would contradict the objective to reduce 
national carbon emissions. 
A way to indirectly support domestic renewables, 
particularly large-scale ones, and secure flexibility 
would be to establish a capacity mechanism, such as 
the proposed “strategic reserve” tentatively envisaged 
by the Federal Council.  A well-designed replacement 
for the current support schemes might alleviate 
concerns about declining domestic production and, 
concurrently, provide incentives to invest in renewable 
energy. Regarding the buildup of (system-serving) 
storage capacity, the structure of grid charges may 
provide decisive incentives to invest; to date, however, 
such incentives for building storage have remained 
limited to pump storage plants.
Without an electricity agreement, Switzerland may 
also be increasingly excluded from European energy 
governance bodies (see Table 1). The process of 
exclusion has already started, but assessments of how 
severe it might become differ. This uncertainty arises 
because decisions on future access of third countries 
like Switzerland are highly political and dependent on 
developments in the context of Brexit. Formal access 
points of Switzerland that may be put at risk include 
ACER, ENTSO-E, and forums under the European 
Commission. A loss of formal access will render 
the physical management of the Swiss electricity 
grid even more challenging and it will reduce Swiss 
capacities for electricity imports. Only the continuing 
physical interdependencies between the Swiss and 
EU electricity grids as well as informal channels of 
influence (e.g., the Pentalateral Energy Forum) may still 
provide Switzerland with some limited, yet increasingly 
instable influence.
Partners by destiny: policy diffusion and the 
need for cooperation
Even in a scenario without an electricity agreement, the 
EU likely continues to affect Swiss energy policy. This 
is because challenges and opportunities experienced 
in the energy transition are similar, which may cause 
policies to diffuse across borders. For example, 
achieving the objectives of the Energy Strategy 
2050 requires improving framework conditions for 
investing in domestic capacity, not least in light of an 
upcoming phase-out of financial support for Swiss 
renewables. Here, European regulation could serve 
as a source of inspiration. Rules on streamlined 
permitting procedures and regulatory predictability 
could lower the perceived policy risk for investments 
in Swiss renewable generation and hence reduce the 
financing cost of Swiss renewable projects. Similarly, in 
line with EU law (Directive 2018/2001), the conditions 
for Swiss small-scale renewable producers could be 
further improved by enabling peer-to-peer trading and 
promoting self-consumption. 
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However, influence is not one-sided but involves 
a significant degree of interdependence. This is a 
direct consequence of a high degree of network 
interconnectedness. With currently 41 interconnectors 
to its neighbors, no other country is physically as deeply 
integrated in the electricity grid of Continental Europe 
as Switzerland. This has two important ramifications 
for the Switzerland-EU energy relationship.
First, interconnectedness implies that disruptions in 
grid stability or security of supply would be equally 
disastrous for the EU as for Switzerland. Already today, 
Swiss non-consideration in cross-border capacity 
calculations threatens stable grid operation. Growing 
volumes of traded electricity in the EU’s internal market 
cause large amounts of unscheduled electricity flows 
through the Swiss network. This results in significant 
system stress—in extreme cases risking a blackout—
that requires strong reactive measures by Swissgrid. 
The planned expansion of flow-based market coupling 
in the EU throughout the coming years will increase 
cross-border flows significantly, thus exacerbating the 
current situation. 
Second, the EU is unlikely to complete its internal 
energy market for electricity without Switzerland. 
Under the current situation, Italy cannot implement 
flow-based market coupling due to large electricity 
flows via the Swiss border, which cannot be accounted 
for in the capacity calculation. The important role of 
Switzerland as a hub for electricity flows through the 
Continental European Grid consequently hints at an 
energy relationship in which also Switzerland has 
something to ‘offer’. 
These two issues highlight that Swiss-EU energy 
relationship may be less asymmetrical than sometimes 
portrayed. An electricity agreement would resolve the 
current discrepancy between physical and regulatory 
integration. However, the Swiss relevance for grid 
stability and the completion of the internal electricity 
market may necessitate a minimum of cooperation 
even in the absence of an electricity agreement in its 
current form. Three scenarios (or their combination) 
appear possible.
First, a successful completion of Brexit might enable 
the EU to revise its principled approach vis-à-vis third 
countries and offer Switzerland alternative forms of 
cooperation. This could involve issue-specific and 
case-by-case collaboration, a downsized electricity 
agreement (‘electricity agreement light’), or a de-
coupling of the electricity agreement from the 
unpopular institutional agreement. 
Switzerland is highly interconnected 
with the European electricity grid
The electricity networks of Switzerland and EU 
members are intimately connected. With 41 
interconnectors to its neighbors, Switzerland is the 
most interconnected part of the European electricity 
grid. In 2018, Switzerland imported 30.4 TWh of 
electricity from Austria, France, Germany and Italy 
and exported 31.8 TWh to these countries. Over the 
same period of time, Swiss total power production 
amounted to 63.6 TWh. The relatively high share 
of cross-border electricity flows not only ensures 
electricity supply for Switzerland but equally 
highlights its importance as a transit country. As 
a consequence, also the security of electricity 
supply in the EU and the functioning of the internal 
electricity market depend to a considerable degree 
on Switzerland’s transit role.
Source: Swissgrid
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Second, cooperation under private law between 
Swissgrid and ENTSO-E or TSOs of neighboring 
countries may involve Switzerland in cross-border 
capacity calculation. Such contracts are already being 
developed, yet they only provide a second-best option 
for Swiss participation in market coupling. Moreover, 
their compatibility with EU law remains unclear, 
creating a degree of uncertainty. 
Finally, the incoming European Commission may open 
new avenues for collaboration with third countries. 
Ursula von der Leyen appears determined to make her 
self-proclaimed “European Green Deal” a cornerstone 
of her presidency. Swiss hydropower and pump storage 
capacity, the highly interconnected network and proven 
expertise could help turn these ambitions into reality; 
a scenario that would in turn require common rules for 
efficient electricity cross-border trade. 
